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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dale Francis Crooks appeals from his judgment and sentence entered 
upon his conviction of possession of a controlled substance at trial. Specifically, 
Crooks challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state filed an Information charging Crooks with possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
(R., pp. 68-69.) Crooks filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the search that 
led to the discovery of the methamphetamine violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, 5 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp. 72-73.) 
Specifically, Crooks contended that the frisk of his person was unconstitutional 
because the agent who conducted the frisk had no specific or articulable facts 
that Crooks was armed or dangerous. [R.? pp. 125-26.) 
At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that Kristopher Eby, a 
resident of the home where the Crooks was located, was on felony probation and 
that his probation included a term that he would submit to searches of his 
personal property, automobile, and residence without a search warrant at the 
request of his probation officer. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 4-1 1 .) The parties also stipulated 
that a search warrant was authorized for the residence. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-22.) 
The state then presented the following uncontested facts: Sergeant 
Hildebrant of the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office received a telephone call from 
Ruth Brownlee, a probation officer, who told him that one of her probationers, 
Kristopher Eby, was selling methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 14, L. 21 - p. 15, L. 3.) 
Brownlee told Hildebrant that Eby was harassing Katie Kelly for money that she 
owed him for past methamphetamine purchases. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 22-25.) 
Sergeant Hildbrant also learned that because Eby was on probation, he would 
not keep methamphetamine at his home but that Dale Crooks would keep it for 
him, and that Eby would contact Crooks to bring him the methamphetamine 
when making a sale. (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 2-7.) 
Sergeant Hildebrant contacted Kelly and arranged for her to make a 
controlled purchase from Eby. (Tr., p. 15, L. 8 - p. 17, L. 3.) She was fitted with 
a transmitter and given money to purchase methamphetamine from him. (Tr., p. 
17, Ls. 3-1 3.) At Eby's residence, Kelly purchased methamphetamine from Eby, 
who had just purchased it from his neighbor, Tom. (Tr, p. 18, Ls. 21-25.) After 
leaving Eby's residence, Kelly turned the methamphetamine over to Sergeant 
Hildebrant. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 6-1 0.) 
Based on the controlled purchase and information from Kelly, Sergeant 
Hildebrant requested that officers go to Eby's residence and secure the premises 
in anticipation of a search warrant. (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 15-21 .) Shortly thereafter, 
while waiting for the search warrant to be issued, probation officer Brownlee and 
assisting officers, including Special Agent Sotka of the FBI, entered the 
residence pursuant to the terms of Eby's probation, detained and handcuffed all 
of the occupants, and patted down the occupants for officer safety. (Tr., p. 41, L. 
2 - p. 48, L. 6.) Crooks was present in the residence and was also handcuffed 
and patted down. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 9-22.) During the pat down of Crooks, Agent 
Sotka detected an object in Crooks' pants pocket. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 18-20.) Agent 
Sotka asked Crooks if the object was anything .that could be used to harm the 
officers. (Tr., p. 47, L. 25 - p. 48, L. 6.) Crooks replied that it was a pipe and told 
the agent that he could remove it from his pocket. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-19.) Upon 
removing the pipe, Agent Sotka placed it on the table (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 9-10.) 
Shortly thereafter, Crooks was arrested. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 7-12.) 
At the suppression hearing, both Sergeant Hildebrant and Agent Sotka 
testified that weapons are commonly associated with narcotics, and that the use 
of weapons is becoming more common. (Tr., p. 23, L. 9 - p. 26, L. 10; p. 55, L. 
17 - p. 56, L. 13.) Agent Sotka further testified that a large percentage of the 
felonies that are committed are violent crime offenses, and that the FBI classifies 
drug dealings as violent crime offenses. (Tr., p. 56, L. 18 - p. 57, L. 3.) 
After the suppression hearing and after hearing argument from the parties, 
the district court denied Crooks1 motion to suppress, ruling: 
Again, in the particular instance, the officer that conducted 
the pat down of Mr. Crooks had knowledge that a narcotics 
transaction had just taken place in that apartment, in that 
residence, in a reasonable time period before the detention and the 
pat down. That it is not uncommon, in fact, it is not at all 
uncommon, it is usual, it is frequent for those who are involved in 
the sale or the delivery of drugs to be armed in some way. And that 
it is not unusual for persons who have been ingesting 
methamphetamine to be aggressive individuals. And there was 
evidence that persons in that particular residence had been 
ingesting methamphetamine, that they may be more aggressive 
persons. All of the reasons led it to being a reasonable precaution 
by law enforcement to conduct the pat of Mr. Crooks outside of his 
clothing. 
At trial, a jury found Crooks guilty of both possession of methamphetamine 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p. 191 .) The district court imposed a 
unified 4 year sentence with 2 years fixed, suspended execution of the sentence, 
and placed Crooks on 3 years probation. (R., pp. 208-12.) Crooks timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 215-17.) 
ISSUES 
Crooks states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in holding that Agent Sotka's frisk of 
Crooks' was objectively reasonable where the evidence admitted at 
the suppression hearing showed that Agent Sotka's conduct in 
frisking Crooks was not based on any articulable facts to believe 
Crooks was presently armed and dangerous. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Crooks failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
Crooks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Crooks asserts that the weapons frisk conducted by Agent Sotka violated 
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 5-7.) Crooks does not challenge the validity of his initial detention. 
Rather, he argues that the pat-down search was unconstitutional because Agent 
Sotka did not have particularized suspicion that Crooks was presently armed or 
dangerous. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Crooks' claim fails and the district court 
correctly denied his motion to suppress. Agent's Sotka's conduct in frisking 
Crooks' for weapons was a constitutionally reasonable measure taken for officer 
safety. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The 
appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. State v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 
(2005); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000). 
C. Crooks Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied 
His Motion To Suppress 
An officer has the authority to conduct a limited, self-protective pat down 
search for weapons while conducting an inquiry pursuant to a lawful investigative 
detention. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979); State v. Rawlings, 121 
ldaho 930, 934, 829 P.2d 520, 524 (1 992). An officer may frisk an individual if 
the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonably 
prudent person to believe the individual with whom the officer is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel this belief. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State v. Babb, 
133 ldaho 890, 892, 994 P.2d 633, 635 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Fleenor, 133 
ldaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). In analyzing a frisk, the 
reviewing court looks to facts known to the officer on the scene and the 
inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of those specific 
circumstances. Babb, 133 ldaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 ldaho at 
555, 989 P.2d at 787. See also State v. Muir, 116 ldaho 565, 567-68, 777 P.2d 
1238, 1240-41 (Ct. App. 1989). 
As an initial matter, there was no testimony that Agent Sotko observed 
any suspicious bulges on Crooks, that Crooks had a known reputation for 
violence, or that he acted in a threatening manner. See State v. Bishop, 146 
ldaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009) (noting factors supporting 
reasonable belief that an individual would be armed). However, courts have 
regularly recognized the danger faced by officers when confronting drug 
enterprises and have frequently validated measures to increase officer safety in 
these situations even where other indicia that a suspect is armed and dangerous 
are absent. An individual's proximity to or involvement with drug transactions or 
distribution can support reasonable suspicion to frisk that individual in 
circumstances where the use of such techniques normally would not have been 
valid had the nature of the suspected criminal activity been considered less 
prone to violence. See e.q., United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding a frisk was valid where the officer "reasonably 
suspected that Johnson might be involved in drug dealing, kidnapping, or 
prostitution" which are crimes "typically associated with some sort of weapon, 
often guns"); United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) 
("Because weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug 
transactions, it is reasonable for an officer to believe that a person may be armed 
and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug 
transaction."); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1086 
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Because the police reasonably suspected [the defendant] of 
dealing in narcotics, it was not unreasonable to believe that he might be 
armed."); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Vlhen [an] 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in [a] vehicle, the officer 
may, in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns, order the occupants 
out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons" given that "the 
indisputable nexus between drugs and guns presumptively creates a reasonable 
suspicion of danger to the officer."); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 
1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a frisk of vehicle occupants was reasonable 
where an officer had observed large amounts of money on the front seat, 
believed that it was drug money, and became concerned for his safety "because 
persons involved with drugs often carry weapons"); State v. Bechtold, 783 P.2d 
1008, 1010 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (the fact that officers "knew that people involved 
in the manufacture and transportation of [methamphetamine] commonly carry 
weapons" was part of justification for the frisk). This proposition is supported by 
Terry itself where the Supreme Court recognized it was reasonable to assume 
from the nature of the offense contemplated that Terry was armed and 
dangerous even though the officer had not observed a weapon or any physical 
indication of a weapon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. 
The Idaho court of appeals followed suit in State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 
76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003). Having received consent to search the premises 
from a home's occupants who were being held on suspicion of manufacturing 
methamphetamine, an officer immediately frisked Dreier who emerged from the 
house prior to the officers' entrance. Dreier, 139 ldaho at 248-49, 76 P.3d at 
992-93. The court of appeals determined that Dreier's exit from a site of 
suspected illegal drug operations was significant in validating the pat down.' 
139 ldaho at 250-51, 76 P.3d at 994-95. The court specifically emphasized that: 
The officer's encounter with Dreier occurred at a home subject to 
search for suspected drug manufacturing activity. The danger 
posed to the safety of an officer conducting a search of premises 
suspected of housing an illegal drug operation is increased by the 
presence of a person found on the premises, who may be involved 
in the criminal activities therein. See State v. Pierce, 137 ldaho 
296, 299-300,47 P.3d 1266, 1269-70 (Ct. App. 2002) (The threat of 
violence to officers conducting a search of home suspected of 
1 The fact that an officer on the scene was aware that Dreier was a frequent 
visitor to the home and that he was known to carry a weapon was also 
considered by the court in its totality of the circumstances inquiry. Additionally, 
the court noted "nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the 
officer's reasonable belief' that Dreier may have been armed and dangerous. 
When asked whether he had any weapons, Dreier had motioned to his side and 
indicated that he did. The officer then recovered a Leatherman tool from Dreier. 
housing an illegal drug operation is greater because of the 
recognized propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to 
carry firearms.). See also United States v. Patterson, 885 F.2d 
483, 485 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The possible danger presented by an 
individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug 
operation is obvious. In fact, it would have been foolhardy for an 
objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a security frisk under 
the circumstances."). 
Id. at 250, 76 P.3d at 994. 
-
Here, Agent Sotka knew that a drug transaction had recently occurred in 
the residence, which led him to conclude that his and the other officers' safety 
was endangered as a result. (Tr., p. 54, L. 18 - p. 57, L. 3.) Moreover, it was 
reasonable for the agent to believe Crooks had some connection to or 
involvement with those transactions. Like Dreier, Crooks was present in a 
private residence associated with illegal drug activity. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 15-17.) 
Furthermore, Agent Sotka was assisting in a probation search while waiting for a 
search warrant to be issued, and knew that Crooks was in company of persons 
known to be associated with drug activity as well as in the presence of a person 
who was on felony probation. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 1-20.) Thus, from an objective 
point of view at the inception of the encounter, it was reasonable for the agent to 
associate Crooks with the suspected criminal activity occurring on the premises. 
These facts validate the frisk. The evidence of drug activity at the 
residence, Crooks' presence inside the residence and his association with its 
occupants, one of whom was a known felon, establish the requisite suspicion that 
Crooks was armed and dangerous at the inception of the frisk. Because drug 
crimes are often accompanied by weapons use, and the need to promptly 
neutralize this risk is crucial to officer safety, the frisk was legally justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dale Francis Crooks' 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 6th day of July 2010. 
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